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RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND DECREE. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff, Respondent, Susan Ester Markham, disagrees with the 
Defendant-Appellant's Statement of the case in one particular. The Appellant 
indicates that the appeal was from the Decree of Divorce entered January 1, 
1986 and from an Order Denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial or in the 
alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend the Decree entered May 12,1986. The 
Appellant's Notice of Appeal states that it was an appeal from the Order of the 
Court filed on the 12th day of May, 1986, denying his Motion for a New Trial or 
in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree. The Defendant's Notice of 
Appeal does not appeal from the Decree of Divorce which was entered and that 
aspect of the case is not properly before the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff basically agrees with the Defendant's Statement of Facts as 
contained in his Appeal Brief. However, the Court is referred specifically to the 
Decree of Divorce concerning all the property which was awarded to the 
respective parties. 
The Decree of Divorce between the parties was signed by Judge Tibbs 
on December 24,1985, and was filed for record on January 3,1986. 
Subsequently, the Defendant filed his Motion for a New Trial or in the 
alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree on January 13,1986. The 
Defendant's Motion was heard before the Court on the 8th day of May, 1986, 
and his Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend 
Decree was denied the following day, May 9,1986 and filed May 12,1986. 
Thereafter, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal from the May 9,1986, Order 
on June 6,1986. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant appealed from the Order of the trial Court denying a Rule 
59 Motion. Defendant's Brief addresses issues and states that it is an appeal 
from the Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff contends that the sole issue on appeal is 
whether the lower Court properly denied the Rule 59 Motion. All other issues 
relating to the Decree of Divorce are outside the scope of the appeal and 
should be discarded. Under Rule 59 the Trial Court properly denied 
Defendant's Motion. There was an evidentiary basis for the Court's decision 
and the judgment rendered was not plainly unreasonable or unjust. The 
resolution of this issue should resolve the appeal. 
Plaintiff argues in Point II, that the Trial Court has wide discretion in 
ascertaining the value of marital property. The lower Court had ample evidence 
of value to reasonably and justly determine those values. The Supreme Court 
is bound to accept the lower Court's values, unless there has been a clear 
abuse of discretion. Just because there were differences of opinion as to value, 
does not mean there was an abuse of discretion where the Court sets the value 
of an item of property. 
Point III addresses the issue of separate property. Plaintiff argues that 
Defendant received all remaining separate property he brought into the 
marriage. Defendant also brought additional property into the marriage, which 
was consumed during the marriage. The Defendant argues that he is entitled 
to a credit for the value of that property. Property distribution must be 
determined based upon the assets remaining at the time of the divorce. 
Defendant's separate property was consumed during the marriage and no part 
of it could be traced to an item of the marital estate. Therefore, he is not entitled 
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to any credit for the property so consumed, and the property distribution, as 
made, was just and reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DEFENDANT APPEALED FROM THE ORDER 
DENYING A NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO 
ALTER OR AMEND THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND NOT 
FROM THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY THE 
COURT. 
The sequence of events in this divorce action indicate that the Decree of 
Divorce was entered in January of 1986. The Defendant made a Motion for a 
New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree on January 
13,1986. This Motion was thereafter heard by the lower Court on May 8,1986. 
The lower Court issued its Order on May 9,1986, denying the Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree. 
The Notice of Appeal filed on June 6,1986, merely took an appeal from the 
Order filed on May 12,1986, denying the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or 
in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree. The Notice of Appeal did 
not take an appeal from the Decree of Divorce itself. 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to Alter 
or Amend Decree was made pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Motion itself does not refer to Rule 59, however, the Defendant 
listed four grounds for his Motion, all of which come directly from Rule 59(a). 
The Defendant listed as his first ground for his Motion the fact that the Decree 
had made an excessive award to Plaintiff. The second ground the Defendant 
listed was that the Decree made an inadequate award of property to the 
Defendant. The third ground for Defendant's Motion was that insufficient 
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evidence was received to support the awards made by the Decree. Finally, the 
Defendant alleged an error in law. 
The first two grounds come from Rule 59(a)(5) which states: 
Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
There is no evidence that the Court made the property division under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. The Defendant has referred to no action or 
conduct by the Court or during the trial which would justify the relief he sought 
by his Motion under rule 59(a)(5). 
Defendant's third point, based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, is 
also unsupportable. The facts concerning the parties' property and valuation 
were well outlined during the course of the trial. There were disputes as to the 
valuation of the property, however, the Court exercised sound judicial discretion 
in ascertaining those values and thereafter dividing the marital estate. The 
Defendant does not suggest what additional evidence may have been 
presented or should have been presented that would have aided the lower 
Court in valuing or dividing the marital estate. The Defendant did indicate that 
no specific values were placed upon various household furnishings, other than 
the testimony of the Plaintiff that the overall value of the household furnishings 
was approximately $2,000.00 and that the parties had paid $800.00 for the 
hutch, and $400.00 for the washing machine and dryer. The small items of 
household furnishings were divided between the parties. In some 
circumstances it would be proper to value each itemized piece of household 
furnishings. In the instant case, the Court had a relatively small amount of 
household items to distribute and based upon the evidence that was presented, 
that being that the entire value of the household furnishings was $2,000.00, it 
can only be assumed that the Court made the determination that an individual 
4 
itemization of property and value was unnecessary and that the parties had 
received, and as the Defendant assumed in his Brief, "that each party was 
awarded approximately one-half the value of those items". Appellants Brief, 
pages 4 and 5. The remaining evidence presented to the Trial Court Judge 
was sufficient in character and detail to allow the Court to make an informed 
decision concerning the division of the marital estate. 
The Defendant's fourth point raised in his Motion for a New Trial or in the 
alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree was that an error in law had been 
made. No error in law was made by the lower Court. The Defendant urges that 
a very unequal distribution of the property was made. The facts as found by the 
lower Court show in reality that a relatively equal distribution of the parties 
property was made. It is of course not incumbent upon a Trial Court to make an 
absolutely equal distribution of property in a divorce situation. This Court has 
held that a property division consisting of a 60% to 40% split between the 
parties is not necessarily inequitable, and that even a wider split is justified in 
some situations. See Workman v. Workman. 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982). 
The standard of review of an appeal brought, challenging a lower Court's 
decision under a Motion seeking a New Trial or Amending a Decree under Rule 
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is well outlined in Nelson v. Trujillo. 657 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1982). The Supreme Court therein stated: 
Where the Trial Court has denied the Motion for a New Trial, its 
decision will be sustained on appeal if there was "an evidentiary 
basis for the jury's decision " The Trial Court's denial of a 
Motion for a New Trial will be reversed only if "the evidence to 
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust". (Citations omitted), Id. at 732. 
The purpose for this Rule is to afford the lower Court maximum latitude 
and discretion in ruling upon Motions under Rule 59. See also Lowe vs. Lvm. 
103 Idaho 259, 646 P.2d 1030 (1982). The lower Court is in the advantaged 
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position of having heard the testimony and other evidence presented and is 
best suited to evaluate the respective claims of the parties. 
There is ample evidence to support the lower Court's decision dividing 
the marital estate between these parties. The Court was therefore justified in 
denying the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to 
Alter or Amend Decree and that decision should now be upheld by this Court. 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HAS WIDE 
DISCRETION IN ACCEPTING VALUES OF MARITAL 
ASSETS. 
In the event this Court looks beyond the scope of Defendant's specific 
Appeal and desires to look further into the Decree of Divorce itself, it will be 
argued herein that the lower Court's judgment is well substantiated and should 
be upheld. 
It is undisputed that the lower Court is in a much more advantageous 
position than is this Court in dealing with the factual issues which surround the 
distribution of a marital estate. This Court must not substitute its judgment for 
the lower Court's on the issues relating to the valuation of the marital estate, 
unless there appears a clear abuse of discretion. This theory has been 
consistently upheld by this Court. This Court has held: 
In order to reverse the Trial Court's distribution of property in a 
divorce action, we must find that it "worked such a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion". 
Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982), Gibbons v. Gibbons. 656 
P.2d 407 at 409. 
In Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), this Court held: 
. . . this Court accords considerable deference to the Findings and 
Judgment of the Trial Court due to its advantageous position. On 
appeal, this Court will not disturb the action of a Trial Court unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the Trial 
Court has abused its discretion, or misapplied principles of law. 
* * * 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of 
properties, it is a prerogative of the Court to make whatever 
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disposition of property as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary 
for the protection and welfare of the parties. In the division of 
marital property, the Trial Judge has wide discretion, and his 
Findings will not be disturbed unless the record indicates an 
abuse thereof. Jd- at 1222. 
Further, in Gill v. Gill. 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986), this Court held: 
In adjusting the financial and property interests of parties to 
divorce, the trial Court is afforded considerable discretion, and its 
actions are cloaked with the presumption of validity. Jd. at 4. 
In Argvle v. Aravle. 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984), the Court held: 
In particular the "(d) determination of the value of the assets is a 
matter for the Trial Court which will not be reviewed in the absence 
of a clear abuse of discretion", Turner v. Turner. Utah 649 P.2d 6, 9 
(1982). 688 P.2d at 470. 
In Turner v. Turner, this Court stated: 
The parties, as is not uncommon, placed widely disparate values 
on the assets to be distributed. 
* * * 
Determination of the value of the assets is a matter for the Trial 
Court which will not be reviewed in the absence of clear abuse of 
discretion. 
* * * 
A Trial Court's apportionment of marital property will not be 
disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion, Jd- at 8. 
See also Sinclair v Sinclair. 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986); and 
Burnham v. Burnham. 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986). 
The Supreme Court in an equity case does have authority to weigh the 
evidence in a divorce action, however, in light of the holdings of this Court, as 
P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), is also applicable herein. In that case, the Court stated: 
To mount a successful attack on the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, 
an Appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the Trial 
Court's Findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the Court below, the evidence is insufficient 
to support the Findings. id- at 1070. 
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The Defendant, in his Brief, has attempted to outline to this Court all of 
the evidence concerning the widely conflicting opinions as to the value of the 
parties' property. As stated in the above cases, it is not uncommon for a Trial 
Court to be faced with widely divergent views as to property values. This Court, 
however, is adamant in its holdings that a determination of property values lies 
within the sound discretion of the Trial Judge. The Trial Court in this instance 
made specific Findings of Fact concerning the value of the major items of 
property of the parties' marriage, namely the home and the commercial 
business. Those Findings of Fact show that the home's value, minus the liens 
against the home, left an equity of $31,000.00 and the business value, minus 
the liens against the business, had an equity value of $21,000.00. Values as to 
other items of property were taken at the trial level, but were not made specific 
Findings of Fact. Plaintiff's 1986 Chevy Truck had an estimated value of $500-
$800.00 (Tr. Page 10, lines 6-8.) Defendant's 1978 Blazer had an estimated 
value of $1500.00-$2,000.00 (Tr. Page 11, lines 10-12). Defendant's tools he 
was awarded had an estimated value of $7,000.00-$10,000.00 (Tr. Page 15, 
lines 2-4). The overall value of the parties' household furnishings was 
estimated to be approximately $2,000.00 (Tr. Page 10, lines 14-15). 
It is apparent that the lower Court had the assets of the parties well in 
mind when it made the distribution of those assets to the respective parties. The 
Trial Court had the opinions of the parties, recent appraisals, offers, and current 
listings to aid the Court in determining the values of the parties' properties. The 
values placed upon the home and business property were determined from 
competent evidence taken at the trial level and cannot now be subject to 
variation by this Court. The remaining items of property were also equitably 
divided between the parties and this Court should not disturb that distribution. 
This Court should uphold the lower Court's Findings and affirm the Judgment 
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distributing the property to the respective parties. The lower Court used sound 
judicial discretion in fixing values and awarding property to the parties. Such 
disti.bu! on is .»! .•r„jl,i,f« iV, ,, IJL.-,I v.i ,,',< »i.-.ou.1.•!< 1 ' r distribution does not 
constitute a clear abuse of discretion, which would justify this Court in setting 
aside either the values placed upon the properties, or the distribution of those 
properties. 
POINT III. DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE SEPARATE 
PROPERTY HE BROUGHT INTO THE 
MARRIAGE 
A recent line of Utah cases has '•e^nm.^ 'h,<i >n qk»Kim\: A p^rsrv 
should receive the real and personal property that he or she brought into the 
marriage or inherited during the marriage. This line of reasoning is of course 
has considerable latitude and discretion in adjusting the financial and property 
interests of the parties. See Pusev v. Pusev. 40 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1986); 
Preston v. Preston. 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedes v. Georoedes. 627 
P.2d 44 (Utah 1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), and 
Humphries v. Humphries. 520 P 2d 193 (Utah VifA). 
The Defendant argues that he should be given credit for $10,000.00 
worth of stock and bonds which he originally brought into the marriage and 
wnier, ^ n - GMiiL.^ qui'mi, ' ^ u i d ^ d and <we proceed-;- uye<< *'> "ie beneu 
and his family (Tr. Page 31, line 18 - Page 32, line 5), and further that he should 
be given credit for $25,000.00 from the proceeds of the Cobra race car which he 
sold during ihw course ol the marriage, $19,000 of which were used to pay the 
common debts and expenses of the parties. ^ Pages 27,28). Six-thousand 
dollars of the proceeds of the Cobra < •• • * / 
the Defendant for his sole use and benefit. (See Appellant's Brief, Page 5). 
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An underlying principle which the Defendant has failed to take into 
account in his reasoning and rationale is that a Court must evaluate the marital 
estate at the time the divorce is granted. As stated in Jesperson v. Jesperson: 
By the very nature of a property division, the marital estate is 
evaluated according to what property exists at the time the 
marriage is terminated. & at 328. 
The same conclusion was reached in Fletcher v. Fletcher. The 
Defendant is arguing that he should be entitled to recoup $35,000.00 which 
was admittedly spent on bills and debts and upkeep of the parties and their 
family. Those funds are not the asset which he brought into the marriage, nor 
can they be traced into any tangible asset existing at the time the marriage was 
terminated. In Pusev v. Pusey. this Court was faced with an argument that one 
of the parties was entitled to receive pre-marital assets and that the division 
made by the lower Court in that case was inconsistent with the decisions of this 
Court which had uniformly returned pre-marital assets to the owner-spouse. 
Preston v. Preston. Georoedes v. Georqedes. Jesperson v. Jesperson. and 
Humphries v. Humphries. The Supreme Court in Pusev v. Pusev stated: 
In every one of those cases proof was made by the prevailing 
spouse that real property had been purchased with pre-marital 
assets, and those assets were awarded to the owner-spouse 
before dividing the marital estate. ]& at 3. 
In reviewing each of these cited cases it can be seen that the pre-marital 
assets awarded to a party as their sole property was indeed the very asset they 
brought into the marriage, or an asset directly traceable from the proceeds of 
the original asset. These cases simply have no application to the case before 
the Court at this time except as to the remaining funds from the Cobra race car 
which were awarded to the Defendant and the Model T automobile which was 
awarded to the Defendant. It can be seen that the value of those separate items 
was not taken into account in valuing the remaining assets of the parties and 
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making the distribution as !U j lowor Court did ihe general rule of returning 
separate property to the particular party is not an absolute rule. In Workman v. 
Workman, the Court stated: 
In some instances, equity will require that each party to a divorce 
recover the separate property he or she brought to the marriage. 
(Citing Preston v. Preston^. However, that rule is not invariable, 
and we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court's not 
applying it in the circumstances of this case. Jd. at 933. 
There is no evidence that any of the property divided by the lower Court 
was held or contemplated as separate property or owned exclusively by the 
Defendant. As stated in 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation. §881: 
. . .In order to overcome the presumption that property owned by 
the parties is marital, a spouse must prove that the entire property 
was acquired exclusively as non-marital property and that its 
character was not subsequently altered by action of the owner. 
The rationale behind such a rule is self-evident. Once parties have 
married, they routinely join their assets and begin living what is hoped to be ^ 
life of peace and bliss. It would be incongruous and indeed a fallacy to 
presume that parties, once they were married, would maintain properties in a 
separate identity I he presumption is ot course that property owned by the 
parties is marital property. Either spouse has an opportunity to overcome that 
presumption and show that any particular piece of property is indeed his soul 
and separate property ie authority found in 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and 
Separation. §890 may be helpful to clarify this point further. This Section states 
in part: 
Property which is separate at its inception may lose its separate 
characteristic if it is not kept segregated. In other words, where a 
spouse who holds non-marital property causes it to be co-mingled 
with marital property, or with the non-marital property of the other 
spouse, such co-mingled property is presumed to be marital 
property, regardless of the status of the title. Specifically, money 
brought into a marriage as separate property becomes marital 
property when placed in a joint bank account or joint certificate of 
deposit with the other spouse. Where marital and non-marital 
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property are co-mingled and then exchanged for new property, the 
newly acquired asset is marital property regardless of the state of 
the title of such asset. 
This logic would also apply to the proceeds of any pre-marital asset used 
or consumed during the course of the marriage relationship. 
The Defendant's Appeal must be dismissed and the lower Court's 
Judgment affirmed. Defendant's fundamental dispute as shown in his Brief, 
was the division of the equity and real property and improvements between the 
parties. (Appellant's Brief, Page 5). The Defendant has not shown, and the 
record does not reflect, that any of his pre-marital assets, namely the 
$35,000.00 or proceeds from those assets, were used to purchase or improve 
the property which was divided by the lower Court between the parties. The 
record reflects the fact that those funds were consumed during the course of the 
marriage, and cannot now be identified with any asset whatsoever. The lower 
Court's distribution of the assets of the marriage was justly and equitably done. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower Court's Judgment should be affirmed. The lower Court's 
denial of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to 
Alter or Amend Decree under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
a proper Order and was not manifestly unjust or unreasonable in light of the 
circumstances of the case. Since this is the only Order that the Appellant-
Defendant has directly appealed from, the Court should affirm the lower Court's 
Judgment and need not address the remaining issues raised in Appellant's 
Brief. However, in the event this Court makes a further review of the particular 
facts and circumstances of the Decree of Divorce itself, the lower Court's 
Judgement and Order of distribution of the property should likewise be affirmed. 
The Court made adequate Findings as to the value and extent of the marital 
property of the parties. The Court took into account pre-marital assets which 
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were in existence at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered. The Court 
distributed the properly in .1 'l...iu and equitable manner. The fact that the 
Defendant may have brought certain property into the marriage which was used 
and consumed during the marriage, does not give him a rig hi in have the 
Decree of Divorce modified or a new trial granted on the grounds that that 
contribution was not taken into account. The law would not justify the Court in 
giving the Defendant credit for ihor:,e funds win; h were consumed during the 
marriage. 
The lower Court Judgment should be affirmed in all particulars. 
RESPEC submitted this ^ day of UCbjJxv 1986. 
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